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Abstract
1As the primary federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of food, drugs, medical
devices, and cosmetics, The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has enormous responsibility.
With this responsibility comes power. Through its various enforcement mechanisms, the FDA seeks
to protect the health and welfare of Americans. One mechanism the FDA employs involves the
use of publicity to warn the public about potentially hazardous products. This adverse public-
ity1,regardlessof the accuracy of the information contained therein, can have a disastrous impact on
the target of the publicity. At times, it has resulted in signiﬁcant business losses or even cessation of
the business’ operations. Parties harmed by this adverse publicity have turned to the courts, largely
unsuccessfully, to recover damages from loss proﬁts and/or to enjoin the FDA from disseminating
adverse publicity regarding their products. Courts generally have failed to rule in favor of these
plaintiﬀs. This paper discusses these cases. It begins with a brief overview of the agency’s publicity
practice, including the statutory basis, the means through which the agency disseminates this infor-
mation, and the beneﬁts and disadvantages of the practices. Next, the paper analyzes the case law
involving plaintiﬀs who brought action against the FDA because of adverse publicity, starting with
those in which plaintiﬀ have been unsuccessful and then concluding with those in which they have
not. This paper concludes with recommendations for ways to balance the needs of the public to be
alerted to potential health hazards with the needs of the companies aﬀected by the publicity.
Statutory Authority
The FDA is one of the few federal agencies that have expressed statutory authorization to disseminate
information to the public. Section 375(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) empowers
the FDA to cause to be disseminated information regarding food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics in situations
2involving, in the opinion of Secretary, imminent danger to health or gross deception to the consumer.”2
Further, this provision authorizes the FDA to collect, report, and illustrate results of FDA investigations.3
The publicity is disseminated through various means including press releases4, speeches5, the agency’s oﬃcial
magazine, FDA Consumer6, and news conferences.
Beneﬁts
The beneﬁts of this publicity are quite obvious. As Gellhorn notes, by disseminating this information, the
FDA “serves its most important and accepted function in warning the public of imminent perils to health
and safety.”7 Additionally, publicity is necessary in light of the limited formal enforcement remedies the
FDA has at its disposal. Under the FDCA, the FDA has two major means of removing defective products
from the market, injunctions8 and seizures9, both of which require court approval and can be costly and
time-consuming.10 Further, these measures can prove ineﬀective if the manufacturer is uncooperative.11
221 U.S.C. § 375(b). Section 375(a) authorizes the FDA to publish “from time to time reports summarizing all judgments,
decrees, and court orders which have been rendered under this chapter, including the nature of the chare and the disposition
thereof.” This paper does not focus on FDA actions initiated under this provision.
3See id.
4See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration, FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Tysabri, a New Drug
for MS, FDA News (2005) (warning “patients and health care providers about the suspended marketing of
Tysabri while the agency and the manufacturer evaluate two serious adverse events reported with its use”), at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW01158.html
5See, e.g., Lester M. Crawford, D.V.M., Ph.D., FDA Acting Commissioner, Remarks before Pharmaceutical Education
Associates(March 22, 2005) (stating that the FDA issued a warning letter to drug manufacturer Novartis regarding the manu-
facturer’s promotional claims that its product is eﬀective in treating patients with type 2 diabetes and hypertension to preserve
renal function”), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2005/pea0322.html.
6See, e.g., Lead Contamination in Candy, FDA Consumer (July-August 2004) (warning that “some Mexican candy sold
in the United States has been associated with lead contamination, and that the FDA is advising that it would be prudent to
not allow children to eat these products”)., 2004 WLNR 11481159, available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/departs/2004/404 upd.html#lead.
7Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1380, 1407 (1973)
828 U.S.C. §332.
9See U.S.C. § 334 which provides in part that “any article of food, drug, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded...shall
be liable to be proceeded against...on libel of information and condemned in any district court of the U.S.”
10See Gellhorn, supra note 7; See also Recall Procedures, FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual March 2004
(stating that “[r]ecalls aﬀord equal consumer protection but generally are more eﬃcient and timely than for-
mal administrative or civil actions, especially when the product has been widely distributed”), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm/pdf/ch7.pdf.
11Id.
3Gellhorn argues that the because the FDA does not have the authority on its own to detain products
pending investigation, the FDA has used its publicity power in conjunction with its practice of “voluntary
recalls” not only to warn the public but also as a means of ensuring compliance.12.
Negative FDA publicity from the FDA can be fatal to the subject of the publicity. The targeted parties
are virtually powerless in stopping the message. Adverse publicity can lead to liability suits, trade rejection
and returns, brand name hostility, and physician fear of malpractice claims from using a publicized drug.13
Because of the heavy competition involved with getting products on the market, retailers have little incentive
to keep a targeted product on its shelves. For example, a major drug retailer pulled a medical device from
its shelves immediately after the FDA issued an alert regarding the device. 14
Critics argue that FDA adverse publicity is used unjustiﬁably and in circumstances outside the prescribed
statutory scope.15 The statute provides that adverse publicity is warranted in instances of imminent danger
and gross deception, however, some argue that the FDA does not limit its publicity to these circumstances.
For example, the FDA issued a Class III recall of approximately 15,000 candy bars. The FDA deﬁnes Class
III recalls as those that are “routine situation[s] in which the consequences to life are remote or are non-
existent.”16 Although the company recalled the product, the FDA published this information in sources
including the Wall Street Journal.17
12Id. at 1407-8 (arguing that the FDA ensures compliance by threatening seizure, injunction, and the issuance of publicity,
with the threat of publicity having the most impact); see also John M. Packman, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 437, 439 (stating
that when a salmon distributor refused to recall a product contaminated with lysteria, FDA’s parent agency, the Department
of Health and Human Services, issued a press release stating that the distributor was uncooperative and refused to recall the
product).
13Morey, FDA Publicity Against Consumer Products–Time for Statutory Revitalization? 30 Bus Law 165, 167 (1975).
14See id. citing FDA Quarterly Report, First Quarter 1987, at 20 (1987)
15See Richard S. Morey, Publicity as a Regulatory Tool, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 469, 470 (1975).
16Id.
17Id.
4The FDA is not required to notify companies of its intention to issue adverse publicity. Thus, companies
often do not have an opportunity to respond to the FDA’s concerns. As the following situation illustrates,
this is especially problematic when the publicity contains misleading or inaccurate information.
The Cranberry Crisis
During a 1959 pre-Thanksgiving press conference, Arthur Flemming, the then Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (“HEW”) stated that certain Washington- and Oregon-grown cranberries were potentially
hazardous because they contained pesticides shown to cause cancer in laboratory rats and that he was not
going to eat them at Thanksgiving dinner.18 Because it was diﬃcult to determine where particular cranber-
ries were grown, this announcement led to almost the complete wipeout of the national cranberry market.19
This publicity resulted in approximately $21,500,000 unsold pounds of cranberry.20 Later testing revealed
that of the approximately 33,600,000 million pounds of cranberries tested, only 325,800 pounds were found
to be contaminated. 21 Although, even though 99 percent of it was subsequently cleared and approved by
the government, the majority of the cop was unsold. 22 The government compensated the cranberry growers
approximately 9 million dollars for the destroyed market.23
FTCA
18See Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1380, 1408 (1973);
19Id.
20Id.
21Id. at -10 (1973); see also Edward Smith, The Cranberry Scare and Cabinet Immunity, 16 Food Drug Cosm L.J. 209, n3
(1961);
22Id.
23Id.
5Other parties have not been as successful as the cranberry growers in their attempt to recover damages due to
adverse publicity. Several companies have turned to the courts to recover damages that the company deems
resulted from the FDA’s adverse publicity. The Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA)24 has been a signiﬁcant
barrier to these plaintiﬀs.
As the following cases illustrate, the discretionary function exemption in the FTCA presents a formidable
obstacle to plaintiﬀs seeking compensation from adverse publicity. The FTCA permits negligence and
intentional tort suits against government in certain instances.25 The discretionary function exception of
the FTCA, however, states that the government retains sovereign immunity with respect to “[a]ny claim
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation,...or based upon the exercise or performance...on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”26 Courts have interpreted
this exception liberally, awarding great deference to the FDA’s discretion to issue publicity. Further, the
FTCA bars suits against the government arising out of libel and misrepresentation.27
Overcoming the FTCA Hurdle
On March 2, 1989, an anonymous caller contacted the US embassy in Chile claiming that cyanide had
been injected in Chilean grapes exported to the US.28 The FDA detained all incoming Chilean fruit while
it investigated the claim. Four days later, having found no evidence of poisoning, the FDA announced
2428 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h)
25§1346(b)(1) permits “civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages...for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his oﬃce or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1).
2628 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
27See 28 U.S.C. 2680(h)
28See Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. U.S., 46 F.3d 279, 282 (1995).
6that the call was a hoax.29 The embassy received another call stating that the cyanide poisoning was not
a hoax. An FDA laboratory in Philadelphia inspected the incoming fruit and concluded that two grapes
appeared to have been punctured and that cyanide could have been injected into the grapes.30 An FDA
lab in Cincinnati, however, found no evidence of cyanide in the grapes. The FDA Commissioner, faced with
the conﬂicting results, issued an order refusing entry of additional Chilean fruit and issued a press release
publicizing the Philadelphia laboratory’s ﬁndings. The press release also encouraged consumers to destroy
fruit in their possession and instructed grocers to remove all Chilean fruit from their shelves.31 As a result,
a group of Chilean growers and fresh fruit exporters sued the U.S. for 210 million dollars under the FTCA.
The suit alleged that the Philadelphia lab technicians were negligent and that the Commissioner issued the
order based on this negligence. The plaintiﬀs’ negligence strategy was their attempt to preclude the FDA
from asserting the discretionary function exemption. The Third Circuit found for the FDA holding that the
process of gathering facts is a part of FDA’s discretionary functions, and the communication to the public
about risk was a discretionary decision of the FDA Commissioner.32
29Id.
30Id. at 282-3.
31Id at 283.
32Id. at 288.
7A plaintiﬀ seeking to recover due to incorrect adverse publicity can avoid the discretionary function bar-
rier by obtaining a private bill through Congress permitting a waiver of sovereign immunity to bring suit
in the Court of Claims.33 This was the situation in Mizokami v. US.34 The plaintiﬀs were growers and
shippers of fresh vegetables.35 In 1962, the FDA inspected samples of plaintiﬀs’ spinach for violations
of the FDA. Preliminary tests concluded that some of the spinach was contaminated with heptachlor, a
pesticide. The FDA commenced a seizure action against “418 bushels of spinach” on grounds that it
was contaminated or adulterated within the meaning of the FDCA. Plaintiﬀs initiated its own inspec-
tion of the spinach which concluded that heptachlor was not present in the tested samples. Plaintiﬀ
notiﬁed the FDA of these results. After having a sample of the condemned spinach retested using more
sensitive means than had been used previously, and ﬁnding no presence of the pesticide, the Deputy Com-
missioner of FDA admitted to plaintiﬀs that its original conclusion was erroneous. The plaintiﬀs sought
damages of $543,879.96 asserting negligence and willful misrepresentation.36 The plaintiﬀ’s obtained a pri-
vate bill37tocircumventtheFTCA
0sbaragainstsuitstheseclaims.38 The court held that the bill waived the sovereign
immunity protection and stated that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to presume that Congress passed the
bill in question merely to send plaintiﬀs to this forum for a ritual conﬁrmation of the Neustadt rule and
concomitant dismissal of their petition.”39 The court further held that the bill concedes liability for the
FDA’s actions but left if up to the court to determine the appropriate damages and whether there was a
causal link between the FDA’s actions and the resulting harm.40 The court found that plaintiﬀs’ estab-
lished a suﬃcient connection between the FDA’s actions and the plaintiﬀ’s alleged losses and awarded the
plaintiﬀs approximately $300,000 in damages.41
The plaintiﬀs in Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States 42 also attempted to obtain a private bill to
bring suit but were unsuccessful. There, a dish importer sued the FDA after its sales declined subsequent to
421977 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 336 (1977).
8an FDA press release warning that sales of certain dishes were aﬀected after an FDA press release warned
against the use of claimant’s dinnerware. The press release stated, in part, that the FDA warned consumers
in certain areas to “avoid using a brand of imported English dinnerware after analysis of the product revealed
very high levels of leachable lead content...” 43 The press release further stated that the FDA began an
investigation after learning “that a Baltimore child became ill apparently from eating a fruit preparation
stored in [the dinnerware]...”44 After the press release, plaintiﬀ initiated a voluntary recall of the products.
After discussions with the plaintiﬀ, approximately two months after the initial press release, the FDA issued
a second press release indicating that the dinnerware was less hazardous than had been indicated in the
previous release.45 The press release stated that decals could be a source of leachable lead, but that decal-
bearing dinnerware presented a health hazard only if used to store acidic foods or beverages.”46 The plaintiﬀ
alleged that the second press release came too late after the initial one and sought recovery for the losses
incurred by the recall. The court denied recovery and recommended that the private bill not be enacted.47
Another possible means of avoiding the discretionary function exemption is if the plaintiﬀ can show that
the agency’s actions did not result from an exercise of its discretion but from a failure to adhere to its own
policies. The discretionary function exemption is inoperative if the FDA violated its own regulations. If
a plaintiﬀ can show that it sustained injury as a result of the FDA’s breach of its duty, the plaintiﬀ can
possibility recover because the FDA had no discretion to breach its duty. For example, in Berkovitz v United
States,48 a plaintiﬀ who contracted polio after ingesting the oral polio vaccine sued the FDA for its approval
of the vaccine’s production and distribution.49 The plaintiﬀ alleged that by approving the use of the vaccine,
43Id. at 8-9
44Id.
45Id. at 10.
46Id. at 10-11.
47Id. at 91-2.
48486 US 531 (1988).
49Id. at 533.
9the FDA violated its policy regarding the inspection and approval of vaccines.50 The Court rejected the
government’s assertion of the discretionary function exemption holding that the exemption is inapplicable
“when a federal statute, regulation, or policy speciﬁcally prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow.”51 In this situation, the Court reasoned, the government oﬃcial lacks has no discretion to disregard
its policy and thus its actions do not involve judgment or choice. Thus, “there is no discretion in the
conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect.”52 Plaintiﬀs suing for publicity-related losses
likely cannot utilize the Berkowitz exception to the discretionary function rule since the holding narrowly
applies to the agency’s failure to follow speciﬁc, prescribed regulations. Although the agency attempted to
establish regulations regarding its use of publicity, the FDA does not have speciﬁc regulations governing this
practice.53
Unconstitutionality of Publicity Provision §375(b)
Some plaintiﬀs have sought recovery by arguing that §375(b) of the FDCA is an unconstitutional violation of
due process. For example, in Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v Folsom,54 the plaintiﬀ ﬁled suit to enjoin the FDA from
disseminating circulars warning the public that the plaintiﬀ’s cancer treatment was ineﬀective in treating
internal cancer.55 The plaintiﬀ claimed that Section 375(b) was unconstitutional denial of due process as it
contains no notice or hearing requirement.56 The court rejected this claim stating that by disseminating the
circulars, the FDA was not issuing an order, adjudicating rights or issuing directions and thus there was no
basis for notice or a hearing.57 The court further held that the FDA was merely performing a public duty
50Id.
51Id. at 536.
52Id.
53The FDA published a policy statement on the agency’s future use of pretrial publicity. 42 Fed. Reg. 12436 (Mar. 4, 1977)
54155 F Supp 376 (DDC 1957), aﬀd without opinion, 513 F2d 625 (3d Cir 1975)
55Id. at 377.
56Id. at 378
57Id.
10by warning the public and that the challenged statute only expressly authorized the government to do what
it was already implicitly permitted to do.58
Similarly, in Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc v FDA,59 a class of health food distributors sought to enjoin the FDA
agency from issuing press releases and public announcements which used the terms “quacks,” “faddists,”
and “shotgun mixtures.”60 The plaintiﬀs alleged that the publicity amounted to the deprivation of property
without due process and wrongful and unlawful interference with the plaintiﬀs’ right to conduct business.61
The plaintiﬀs sought $500 million in recovery.62 The court rejected the plaintiﬀ’s claim holding that the
press releases were statements were within the scope of the privilege aﬀorded to government oﬃcials acting
in oﬃcial capacity.
Enjoining Use of Publicity
In United States v Diapulse Mfg Corp,63 a drug company sought to enjoin the FDA from issuing public state-
ments related to the FDA’s misbranding action against the company. The statements at issue were a report
that contained two pages of reference to the misbranding action and a speech by then FDA Commissioner
Goddard delivered to the Congress of Medical Quackery stating, “You probably know of the ’Diapulse’ case.
This device, seized in Atlanta, Georgia, used electrical impulses to supposedly treat arthritis, hypertension,
sinusitis, middle ear infections, TB, syphilis, toxemia, asthma, hepatitis, diabetes, gangrene, pneumonia,
and other conditions.64 The court denied the injunction holding that the statements constituted reasonably
58Id.
59378 F Supp 210 (DNJ 1974)
60Id. at 218.
61Id. at 213.
62Id. at 211.
63262 F Supp 728 (D Conn 1967).
64Id. at 729-30.
11factual statements of the parties claims and of the claims made about the device that were made within
the authority of section 375(b).65 The court further stated that the statements “reﬂect[ed] a commendable
performance by the FDA of a public duty imposed by Congress in disseminating information.66
65Id. at 729-30.
66Id. at 730.
12Establishing Link between Publicity and Resulting Harm
Another hurdle faced by the plaintiﬀs may be establishing a causal link between the publicity and the result-
ing harm. In California Canners & Growers v. United States,67 a fruit growers association sued the FDA
to recover losses they alleged resulted from statements made by the FDA during a October 1969 press con-
ference.68 During the press conference the then HEW secretary announced that he was ordering cyclamate,
an artiﬁcial sweetener, be removed from the list of substances “generally recognized as safe [GRAS] for use in
foods.69Additionally,thethenFDACommissionerreleasedastatementconcurringintheSecretary0sinstructionsandannouncingtheremovalofcyclamatesfromtheGRASlistandpublishedtheremovalorderintheFederalRegister.70Thecourtheldthattheconclusionregardingthecyclamate0scarcinogeneityreachedbytheSecretary,theFDACommissionerandtheotherofficialsandthecorrespondingstatements“werenotarbitraryorunreasonable00andthusprovidednobasisforplaintiff0sclaims.71Thecourtfurtherheldthatevenifthegovernment0sactionswereactionable,plaintiffsfailedtoshowthattheirbusinesslossesresultedfromthepublicity.72
679 Cl. Ct. 774; 1986 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 882 (1986).
68Id. at 776.
69Id. at 777. The Secretary further stated in part:
Recentexperimentsconductedonlaboratoryanimalsdisclosedthepresenceofmalignantbladdertumorsafteranimalshadbeensubjectedtostrongdoselevelsofcyclamatesforlongperiods.Thefindingsoftheseexperimentsformthebasisformyaction.ThefactthatcyclamateshaveinducedcancerinanimalswasconfirmedbyapaneloftheNationalAcademyofScience....[L]letmeemphasizeinthestrongestpossibletermsthatwehavenoevidenceatthispointthatcyclamateshaveindeedcausedcancerinhumans....Thus,mydecisiontoremovecyclamatesfromthelistofapprovedsubstancesinnosenseshouldbeinterpretedasalifesavingoremergencymeasure.Ihaveactedundertheprovisionsoflawbecauseitisimperativetofollowaprudentcourseinallmattersconcerningpublichealth.Id.
70Id. at 778.
71Id. at 784.
72Id.
13Adverse Publicity and Pretrial Publicity
Even in cases where the plaintiﬀs do not recover, FDA publicity may still be found to constitute preju-
dicial pretrial publicity. In United States v Abbott Labs, Inc, 73 the defendant laboratories were indicted
for introducing into commerce adulterated and misbranded intravenous solution drugs. Hours after the
indictment was handed down, the FDA issued a press release stating that 50 deaths had been attributed
to defendants’ intravenous solutions.74 The Fourth Circuit held that FDA statements with was prejudicial
and highly inﬂammatory.75 Although the court failed to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
publicity precluded the defendants right to a fair trial,76 the court nonetheless indicated its “strongest
disapproval that highly placed legal oﬃcers would make a statement of this important with regard to a
pending criminal prosecution and even more so that FDA...would issue a press release containing such
prejudicial material.”77
14Recommendations
Because plaintiﬀs have been largely unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for losses due to FDA publicity,
standards should be created that both recognize the legitimate interests of targeted companies but that that
do not hamper the FDA’s authority to utilize its publicity power appropriately. Speciﬁcally, be standards
should created that address the issue of notice to the company, retraction/correction of inaccurate publicity,
format of the publication, and publication involving judicial or administrative proceedings. Guidance for
creating these standards can be found in three sources –the Administrative Conference’s (“Conference”)
recommendations regarding agency use of adverse publicity,78 the FDA’s statement regarding its publicity
policy79, and other agency statutes.
Notice
At a minimum, the FDA should be required to notify the publicity’s target of its intention of issuing the
publicity. The Conference recommended that “[a]ny respondent or prospective respondent in an agency
proceeding shall, if practicable and consistent with the nature of the proceeding, be given advance notice
of information to be released about the proceeding and a reasonable opportunity to prepare in advance a
response to the information released.80
Even with a notice requirement, the FDA should still be allowed to discretion to determine when providing
78See Adverse Agency Publicity, 1 C.F.R. s 305.73-1 (1973); see also Release of Adverse Information to the News Media, 45
C.F.R. 17(1976).
79See Administrative Practices and Procedures: Publicity Policy, 42 F.R. 12436 (March 4, 1977).
80See 45 CFR 17.6; See also, James T. O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure, 2d., FEDINFO §25:02(advocating for a
notice requirement similar to the one found in the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2), which has a 30 days
normal and 24 hours minimum notice requirement.”
15notice would compromise public safety. This is reﬂected in the Toxic Substance Control Act which requires
the agency to “notify, in writing and by certiﬁed mail, the manufacturer, processor, or distributor in com-
merce” prior to publicizing conﬁdential data about the company.81 The statute provides an exception to
this notice requirement if the release of such data is necessary to protect against an imminent, unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment, such notice may be made by such means as the Administrator
determines will provide notice at least 24 hours before such release is made.82
Similarly, the Consumer Protection Safety Commission (CPSC) is statutorily required to “notify and provide
a summary of the information to [the targeted company] if the manner in which such consumer product is
to be designated or described in such information will permit the public to ascertain readily the identity of
such [company], and shall provide [the company] with a reasonable opportunity to submit comments to the
Commission.” 83 The statute requires 30 days notice but permits lesser notice if the agency deems that such
notice is needed in the interests of public health and safety.84 The statute further provides that the agency
“shall take reasonable steps to assure...that information from which the identity of such manufacturer or
private labeler may be readily ascertained is accurate, and that such disclosure is fair in the circumstances and
reasonably related to eﬀectuating the purposes of this Act.”85 Also, if a company challenges the accuracy of
information the agency intends to disclose, but disagrees, the agency must notify the company of its intention
to publicize the information within 10 days of the agency receiving notiﬁcation of the alleged inaccuracy.86
Further the agency must, at the company’s request, “ include with the disclosure any comments or other
information or a summary thereof submitted by such manufacturer or private labeler.” 87
8115 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2)(A)
8215 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(B)(i)
8315 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1)
84Id.
85Id.
86Id. § 2055(b)(2)
87Id.
16The FDA conceded the appropriateness of providing companies with notice of intended adverse publicity.
It stated, however, that it would only notify the company of the subject of the intended publicity without
providing the company with the full text.88 The Agency noted that it would not provide advance notice of
proposed rule making or initiation of agency action.
Correction of Inaccurate Publicity
The FDA should be required to issue corrective or retroactive publicity once it learns of the inaccuracy
of previously published information.89 The Conference recommended that in the event the information
contained in the publicity is “erroneous or misleading and any person named therein requests a retraction
or correction, the agency should issue the retraction or correction in the same manner (or as close thereto as
feasible) as that by which the original publicity was disseminated.”90 Although corrections and retractions
may prove ineﬀective at undoing the harm of inaccurate publicity, as was seen in the cranberry crisis, they
may potentially assistance companies in their eﬀorts to recover from the eﬀects of inaccurate publicity.
The public may trust corrective information from the company if it accompanies FDA issued corrective
information. The FDA’s proposed regulations recognized the need for issuing corrections and retractions.
Format of the Publication
88See Administrative Practices and Procedures, supra, note 79.
89The FDA has done so both voluntarily, for example in the cranberry scare discussed above, and as a result of court order.
See, e.g., United States v. International Medication Sys, No. 73-626-WPG (C.D. Cal. 1973). Here the. The FDA sent letters
to approximately 7,000 hospitals warning the hospitals that the sterility of some of IMS’s products were compromised and
presented a “potential hazard to the public health.” The court found that the FDA violated its statutory authority by sending
the letters and ordered the FDA to issue a subsequent letter to the same recipients informing them of the court’s ruling and that
the company was found to not be guilty of violating good manufacturing practices “to the extent that its products represent a
potential hazard to the public health.”
901.C.F.R. 305.73-1
17The Conference also recommended the publicity should be “factual in content and accurate in description”
and that the agency should avoid the use of disparaging terminology.”91 This requirement may have pre-
vented the FDA from using terms such as “quackery” in Ajay Nutrition. In its proposed regulations, the
FDA stated that it believes “there’s no way [disparaging] terminology can be entirely avoided” when the
publicity is issued to warn the public of a public health threat or to report on an FDA action regarding
the product. The agency conceded, however, that it should avoid the use of “personally disparaging critical
remarks not required in reporting the facts of a situation.”92 Further, it boldly stated that it will “continue
to seek publicity, when appropriate, even if there is the possibility that the information may be ignored,
misinterpreted, oversimpliﬁed, overstated, or misunderstood by the media or by the public...”93
The FDA should identify whether the information is proven or alleged. This could be done conspicuously
perhaps in the form of a disclaimer.94 Doing so may help the public make more informed choices regarding
how to respond to the publicity.
91Id.
92See Adminstrative Practices and Procedures, supra, note 79.
93Id.
94See O’Reilly, supra, note 79 (quoting FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. 4040 F2d 1308, 1316 (DC. Cir.
1968)) (stating that the FTC attaches a disclaimer to its announced complaints which states that ‘[t]he issuance of a complaint
does not indicate or reﬂect any adjudication of the matters charged”).
18Adjudications
The Conference outlined criteria for the release of adverse publicity related to judicial or administrative
proceedings. 95 It recommends that the agency should prominently disclose when adverse information
contains allegations subject to agency adjudication. Further, respondents to the proceeding, to the extent
practicable, should be given advance notice of the publicity and a “reasonable opportunity to prepare in
advance a response to such publicity.”
For one, adverse publicity should be issued “[w]here the [agency]...determines that there is a signiﬁcant risk
that the public health or safety may be impaired or substantial economic harm may occur unless the public
is notiﬁed immediately...”96 The Conference further recommends that where “public harm can be avoided
by immediate discontinuance of an oﬀending practice, a respondent shall be allowed an opportunity, where
feasible, to cease the practice...in lieu of release of adverse information by the agency.”97 Secondly, use
of publicity should be limited to circumstances where doing so is required to notify parties who would be
interested or aﬀected by the proceeding.98 Thirdly, the Conference recommends that information regarding
agency action is already publicly available through non-Agency means and “is likely to result in media
publicity,” the agency should only issue adverse publicity to the extent needed to “to foster agency eﬃciency,
public understanding, or the accuracy of news coverage.”99
The FDA, in its proposed regulations, defended its use of adverse publicity that may be prejudicial in an
oﬃcial proceeding. The agency believes that it “must risk the dismissal of a prosecution because of the
9545 CFR 17.4
96Id.
97Id.
98Id.
99Id.
19impact of publicity, rather than fail to issue a warning that [it] believes is needed to protect the public.”100
100See Administrative Practices and Procedures, supra, note 79.
20Conclusion
During a congressional hearing conducted in the aftermath of the cranberry crisis, the HEW Secretary
defended the FDA’s actions by stating, “a responsible government...cannot fail to place at the top of its
list of priorities the health of all the people even though by doing so it may be or may appear to be acting
against the economic interests of a segment of our society....The innocent consumer should not be made the
victim...in order to protect the innocent producer.”101 The Secretary’s statements illustrate the obvious
tension between the FDA’s legitimate eﬀorts to protect the public through its use of publicity and the
interests of companies who may be the target of the publicity. There are no easy answers to ways to resolve
this tension, however, the FDA should take guidance from the Administrative Conference recommendations
and other agency statutes that prescribe guidelines for the use of adverse publicity. Because the plaintiﬀs
have limited judicial recourse to recover losses due to inaccurate adverse publicity, and because this publicity
could be fatal the company, regulations should be created to ensure for the accuracy of the information and
adequate notice to the company. The FDA’s strong stance on its use of adverse publicity, as outline in its
proposed regulations, is necessary for the agency to carry out its duty to the public. Consumers need to know
that the agency entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the foods they eat, the medications
and medical devices on which they rely, and the cosmetics they use will not cave in to the pressures from
the companies aﬀected by its publicity policies.
101Hearings before House Committee n Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. H.R. 7624 168-71; The
Cranberry Scare and Cabinet Immunity, 16 Food Drug Cos LJ 209 (1961)
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